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THE SIREN SONG OF INTERROGATIONAL 
TORTURE: EVALUATING THE U.S. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.N. 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
ISAAC A. LINNARTZ† 
ABSTRACT 
  Though the United States officially condemns all forms of torture, 
it has not adequately implemented the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture. This Note focuses on instances in which the United 
States has transferred suspected terrorists to countries that practice 
interrogational torture. It contends that these renditions demonstrate a 
lingering belief that interrogational torture is sometimes necessary to 
obtain vital intelligence information. Unfortunately, this belief has 
developed in a secretive manner that is antithetical to democratic 
principles of transparency and accountability. This Note argues that 
the United States should reject all forms of interrogational torture by 
fully implementing international norms that forbid engaging in or 
facilitating state-sponsored torture. 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
States embarked on an aggressive global antiterrorism campaign 
often described as the “War on Terror.”1 This “War on Terror” has 
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 1. George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States 
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140 (Sept. 20, 2001), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (“Our war on 
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raised questions about the United States’ commitment to 
international norms that prohibit engaging in or facilitating state-
sponsored torture.2 In particular, there have been persistent 
allegations that the United States has “outsourced” torture by 
rendering suspected terrorists to countries that practice state-
sponsored torture.3 Such renditions are often described as 
“extraordinary renditions” to differentiate them from renditions 
carried out according to the regular processes that govern extradition 
and immigration matters.4 Prior to the “War on Terror,” 
extraordinary renditions often involved returning criminals to face 
trial, but the practice has expanded to serve other ends in the struggle 
against terrorism.5 
 
terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group 
of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” (emphasis added)). 
 2. See infra Part IV. 
 3. See, e.g., ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & 
GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO “EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS” 28–35 (2004) (collecting 
reports of renditions to torture carried out by the United States); David Weissbrodt & Amy 
Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 
123–24 (2006) (describing several reports of renditions to torture); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing 
Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106–07, available at http://www.newyorker. 
com/printables/fact/050214fa_fact6 (describing instances in which suspects were rendered to 
other countries and stating that “[t]he most common destinations for rendered suspects are 
Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Jordan, all of which . . . are known to torture suspects”). 
 4. Even renditions carried out according to these regular processes can raise the same 
normative issues that extraordinary rendition does, as is apparent from examining Maher Arar’s 
removal to Syria. See infra notes 18–39 and accompanying text. This Note defines extraordinary 
rendition as the transfer of an individual from the control of the United States to the control of 
a foreign state outside the normal extradition and immigration processes. Furthermore, it uses 
the term “extraordinary rendition” instead of “snatch,” “rendition,” “irregular rendition,” or 
other possible terms. The practice is unquestionably both extraordinary and irregular, but 
“extraordinary rendition” seems to be the most common label. See A. John Radsan, A More 
Regular Process for Irregular Rendition, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2006) (comparing the 
terms “snatch,” “irregular rendition,” and “extraordinary rendition”). 
 5. Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic 
Relations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights, and 
Oversight and the Subcomm. on Europe of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 12 
(2007) (statement of Michael F. Scheuer, Former Chief, Bin Laden Unit, Central Intelligence 
Agency), available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/34712.pdf (discussing the beginning of 
the CIA’s rendition program in 1995 and stating that “interrogation was never a goal under 
President Clinton”). Scheuer proceeded to explain that interrogation was not pursued 
[b]ecause it would be a foreign intelligence or security service without CIA being 
present or in control who would conduct the interrogation, because the take from the 
interrogation would be filtered by that service holding the individual and we never 
knew if it was complete or distorted, and because torture might be used and the 
information might be simply what an individual thought we wanted to hear. 
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A number of journalists and organizations have documented 
extraordinary renditions,6 but many of these individual accounts are 
difficult to verify.7 Despite the disputed validity of these stories, the 
potential for extraordinary renditions as part of the “War on Terror” 
should prompt an examination of how the United States has 
understood and implemented its self-chosen international legal 
obligations to prevent torture—specifically, the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture8 and the Fourth Geneva Convention.9 
Examining these regimes reveals the weakest link in the United 
States’ stance against terror—the possibility that it might transfer 
detainees to countries that practice interrogational torture and then 
partake of the fruits of those interrogations. International law forbids 
such transfers,10 but this Note argues that the United States has not 
effectively implemented these legal principles.11 Indeed, the struggle 
against terrorism has increased the demand for interrogational 
torture, thereby revealing the United States’ failure to fully 
implement international norms against torture into its domestic law.12 
Specifically, this Note contends that the United States has failed 
to fully implement the Convention Against Torture.13 This failure is 
particularly troubling after September 11, 2001, when a focus on 
eliminating terrorism has put a premium on gathering intelligence on 
terrorist operations and spawned theories that might justify 
 
Id.; see also Jules Lobel, The Preventive Paradigm and the Perils of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 1407, 1408 (2007) (“The administration has transformed the practice of extraordinary 
rendition from a mechanism used to transfer accused criminals to a country where they would 
face trial to a preventive technique whereby suspects are sent to third countries not to try them 
for crimes they allegedly committed, but to torture and preventively detain them without charge 
in order to obtain information to prevent future crimes.”). 
 6. For summaries of these accounts, see sources cited supra note 3. 
 7. These accounts are particularly difficult to verify because the United States generally 
does not comment on such intelligence matters, and courts have been hesitant to make findings 
of fact in the limited instances in which the legality of these practices has been litigated. See, e.g., 
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287–88 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing all claims against 
government officials arising from a suspected terrorist’s removal to Syria without evaluating the 
veracity of the allegations or adjudicating the claims on their merits). 
 8. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. 
 9. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter IV Geneva Convention]. 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
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interrogational torture to avert future terrorist attacks.14 The United 
States’ failure to implement the universal prohibition of torture, 
combined with its attempts to finesse similar provisions in the Geneva 
Conventions, has undermined international norms that forbid torture 
regardless of exigent circumstances.15 At the highest political levels, 
torture apparently remains on the table as a legitimate intelligence-
gathering tool.16 Unfortunately, the secrecy that surrounds these 
intelligence matters has shrouded the high-level debate over whether 
torture is ever acceptable, effectively precluding robust public 
discussion over the legitimacy of interrogational torture.17 
These problems are evident in the story of Maher Arar. On 
September 26, 2002, Arar flew into New York’s John F. Kennedy 
International Airport (JFK).18 He was returning to Canada from 
vacationing with his wife and children in Tunisia.19 Arar held dual 
Canadian and Syrian citizenship—he was born in Syria, but had 
immigrated to Canada with his parents at age seventeen.20 During a 
routine immigration inspection at JFK, Arar was detained, searched, 
and questioned.21 FBI agents and immigration officers subsequently 
interrogated him for eight hours.22 Unsatisfied with his answers, they 
placed Arar in solitary confinement.23 After several days, they 
informed him that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
 
 14. See infra Part IV.A. 
 15. See Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 3, at 160 (“Countries that have orchestrated 
extraordinary renditions have sacrificed the moral authority to be leaders in promoting the rule 
of law and respect for human rights. . . . In order to regain international legitimacy, the 
architects of extraordinary rendition may need to take dramatic steps to show the world that 
they intend to play by the rules. Only then will they have a genuine opportunity to compel other 
countries to comply with the important obligations embodied in contemporary human rights 
instruments.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 16. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1460–
61 (2005) (“The only reasonable inference to draw from these recent efforts by the government 
to defend its actions is that the torture culture is still firmly in place, notwithstanding official 
condemnation of torture.”); see also ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 28–35 (collecting reports of renditions to 
torture carried out by the United States). 
 17. See infra Part IV.A. 
 18. Complaint para. 25, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. CV-04-
249-DGT-VVP), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Arar%20Complaint_FINAL.pdf. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. para. 11. 
 21. Id. paras. 26–29. 
 22. Id. paras. 29, 31. 
 23. Id. paras. 32–36. 
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had found him inadmissible because he belonged to the terrorist 
organization al Qaeda.24 When immigration officers asked Arar to 
designate a country for removal, he chose Canada.25 Nevertheless, 
INS officials informed Arar that they had decided to remove him to 
Syria.26 Though Arar expressed fear that he would be tortured in 
Syria, immigration officials told him that “[his] removal to Syria 
would be consistent with Article 3 of CAT [the Convention Against 
Torture].”27 
On October 8, Arar was flown in shackles and chains to 
Washington, D.C., and from there to Amman, Jordan.28 Jordanian 
authorities interrogated and beat him, then turned him over to Syria 
on October 9.29 Syrian security officers intensely interrogated Arar for 
eighteen hours a day for twelve days.30 These interrogations included 
various forms of physical and psychological torture.31 The officers 
beat Arar’s palms, hips, and lower back with a thick electrical cable; 
they also struck his face, stomach, and neck.32 On occasion they 
confined Arar in a “room where he could hear the screams of other 
detainees being tortured.”33 They also threatened him with other 
forms of torture—a spine-breaking chair, suspension in a tire to 
facilitate beating, and electric shocks.34 When he was not facing 
interrogation, Arar was confined in a tiny underground cell that was 
about “six feet long, seven feet high, and three feet wide.”35 Arar 
noted that his interrogators’ questions “bore a striking similarity to 
those asked . . . by FBI agents at JFK in September, 2002.”36 To 
alleviate his suffering, Arar falsely confessed to having “trained with 
terrorists in Afghanistan.”37 
 
 24. Id. paras. 37–38. 
 25. Id. para. 41. 
 26. Id. para. 47. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. para. 49. 
 29. Id. para. 50. 
 30. Id. para. 51. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. para. 52. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. para. 58. 
 36. Id. para. 54. 
 37. Id. para. 53. 
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Though Canadian consular officials visited Arar several times, 
his captors threatened him with additional torture if he disclosed the 
torture he had already experienced.38 Syria eventually released Arar 
without filing any criminal charges and “now considers Mr. Arar 
completely innocent.”39 After his release, Arar filed several claims in 
U.S. district court against the officials who participated in his 
imprisonment, interrogation, and removal to Syria.40 The district court 
dismissed all of his claims.41 The court did not even reach the 
defendants’ assertion of the “state-secrets privilege,” though it 
dismissed Arar’s due process claims because of “the national-security 
and foreign policy considerations at stake.”42 The Center for 
Constitutional Rights, a nonprofit legal advocacy organization acting 
on Arar’s behalf, filed an appeal from the district court’s decision in 
the Second Circuit on December 12, 2006.43 
In Part I, this Note describes the international norm against 
engaging in or facilitating state-sponsored torture embodied in the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture. Part II explains that the 
United States officially condemns all forms of torture and remains 
party to the Convention Against Torture. Part III, however, 
illustrates several shortcomings in the United States’ domestic legal 
implementation of the Convention Against Torture. It also details 
how the United States has rationalized circumventing the Fourth 
Geneva Convention’s restrictions on detainee transfers. Part IV 
examines how increased efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and 
eradicate terrorist networks have made interrogational torture a more 
expedient option than it used to be. In turn, these preventive efforts 
have highlighted the inadequate implementation of international 
norms against torture in domestic law. Finally, Part V advocates 
 
 38. Id. para. 61. 
 39. Id. paras. 64–65. 
 40. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 41. The court dismissed Arar’s various claims on a number of grounds: first, because he 
lacked standing to bring a claim for declaratory relief; second, because the Torture Victim 
Protection Act does not establish a right of action for noncitizens and only covers acts carried 
out under color of foreign law; and third, because his due process claim was foreclosed by an 
exception to the Bivens doctrine. Id. at 287–88. The Bivens doctrine recognizes a cause of action 
for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights are violated by federal agents. Id. at 267. The court also 
dismissed without prejudice the due process claims stemming from Arar’s domestic detention. 
Id. at 287. 
 42. Id. at 287. 
 43. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 06-4126-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 2006), 
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Appellant's%20Brief,%2006-4216-cv.pdf.  
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comprehensive legislative change to increase the structural and 
procedural protections against torture. 
I.  THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST  
TORTURE AND THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION 
The Convention Against Torture and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention codify the international norm prohibiting renditions to 
torture. Together, these international agreements provide the 
strongest protections against rendition to torture. 
A. The United Nations Convention Against Torture 
The United Nations Convention Against Torture codifies and 
strengthens international norms against torture by prohibiting torture 
regardless of what exigent circumstances may arise.44 The Convention 
Against Torture was intended to strengthen existing prohibitions on 
torture in international law.45 For the purposes of the Convention, 
torture is defined as follows: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.46 
 
 44. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 2, para. 2 (“No exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability 
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”). 
 45. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER 
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (1988) (“The principal aim 
of the Convention is to strengthen the existing prohibition of [torture and other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment] by a number of supportive measures.”). The 
Convention’s preamble specifically mentions the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as preexisting international 
prohibitions of torture. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, pmbl. 
 46. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 1, para. 1. 
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This language restricts application of the Convention to instances in 
which torture is politically motivated or sanctioned.47 Thus, the 
Convention Against Torture focuses specifically on state-sponsored 
torture.48 This focus is particularly evident in Article 3, which provides 
the protection most relevant to the practice of extraordinary 
rendition. Article 3 establishes the following requirements: 
1. No State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person 
to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, 
the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant 
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State 
concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights.49 
Article 3 represents an advance over simply prohibiting states from 
engaging in torture because it establishes that “a State is not only 
responsible for what happens in its own territory, but it must also 
refrain from exposing an individual to serious risks outside its 
territory by handing him or her over to another State from which 
treatment contrary to the Convention might be expected.”50 States 
that are party to the Convention are required to implement the terms 
of the Convention through their own legal systems.51 Part III.A 
discusses how the United States has implemented the Convention. 
 
 47. See id. (limiting the definition of torture to instances in which “such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity”). 
 48. Id.; Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The International Law of Torture: From 
Universal Prescription to Effective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 103 
(2001) (stating that the Convention employs a “more restrictive legal definition which includes 
official state sanction and/or participation”). 
 49. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3. 
 50. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 45, at 125. 
 51. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 2, para. 1 (“Each State Party shall take 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any 
territory under its jurisdiction.”); see also Nagan & Atkins, supra note 48, at 98 (stating that 
Article 2 “formally established the specific legal obligation of the state to prevent torture”). 
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B. The Fourth Geneva Convention 
The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the deportation or 
forcible transfer of “protected persons” out of an occupied territory.52 
For the purposes of the Convention, “protected persons” are those 
who “find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands 
of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not 
nationals.”53 In dealing with “protected persons,” Article 49 states 
that “[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of 
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the 
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are 
prohibited, regardless of their motive.”54 According to the leading 
commentary on the Geneva Conventions, “The prohibition is 
absolute and allows of no exceptions, apart from those stipulated in 
paragraph 2.”55 These limited exceptions permit transfers or 
evacuations only in cases in which the “security of the population” or 
“imperative military reasons” demand them.56 Part III.B discusses 
how the United States has rationalized circumventing the protections 
in the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
II.  THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE  
UNITED STATES REGARDING TORTURE 
The United States maintains a strong official stance against 
torture; indeed, President George W. Bush has said, “I want to be 
absolutely clear . . . . The United States does not torture. It’s against 
our laws, and it’s against our values. I have not authorized it—and I 
will not authorize it.”57 Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice has 
echoed this statement, saying that “[t]he United States does not 
permit, tolerate, or condone torture under any circumstances.”58 This 
position was reiterated in the United States’ 2006 presentation to the 
 
 52. IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 49. 
 53. Id. art. 4. 
 54. Id. art. 49, para. 1. 
 55. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 279 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 
Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958). 
 56. IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 49, para. 2. 
 57. George W. Bush, Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1573 
(Sept. 6, 2006). 
 58. Condoleeza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks Upon Her Departure for Europe (Dec. 
5, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57602.htm. 
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Committee Against Torture, which monitors the compliance of 
countries that are party to the Convention.59 In that presentation, 
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor Barry Lowenkron stated that the United States was 
“committed to upholding [its] national and international obligations 
to eradicate torture and to prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”60 In addition, Lowenkron stressed that the 
United States was committed to “transparency about our policies and 
actions.”61 Like many countries, the United States is party to the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture, although it only ratified 
the Convention subject to certain reservations and understandings.62 
Nevertheless, President Bush has also argued that captured 
terrorists are a vital source of intelligence about terrorist 
organizations and operations. According to the president, such 
detainees are “the most important source of information on where 
the terrorists are hiding and what they are planning.”63 Secretary of 
State Condoleeza Rice has repeated these sentiments, arguing that 
some terrorist suspects “have information that may save lives, 
perhaps even thousands of lives,” and that they must be interrogated 
to “gather potentially significant, life-saving, intelligence.”64 The 
emphasis placed on gathering this information raises the question of 
whether the United States would ever engage in or condone 
interrogational torture to pry information out of recalcitrant 
detainees. The answer to this question is more complex than the 
United States’ strong rhetoric against torture indicates. 
 
 59. Nagan & Atkins, supra note 48, at 103 (“The major function of the Committee Against 
Torture is to monitor the implementation of the Convention.”). The Committee Against 
Torture was established under Article 17 of the Convention and acts according to the 
procedures established in Articles 19–21. Id. 
 60. Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Sec’y for the U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights 
& Labor, Opening Statement for U.S.: Hearing at Committee Against Torture (May 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68558.htm. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See infra Part III.A. 
 63. George W. Bush, Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1570 
(Sept. 6, 2006). 
 64. Rice, supra note 58. 
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III.  THE UNITED STATES’  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
A. Implementing the United Nations Convention Against Torture 
The United States Senate ratified the Convention Against 
Torture in November 1994, subject to a number of reservations and 
understandings.65 Under U.S. law, reservations, understandings, and 
declarations are conditions placed on treaties that “are designed to 
harmonize . . . treaties with existing requirements of U.S. law and to 
leave domestic implementation of the treaties to Congress.”66 The 
Senate’s reservations and understandings for the Convention Against 
Torture included a provision stating that “the United States declares 
that the provisions of Articles 1 through 16 of the Convention are not 
self-executing,”67 meaning that the obligations imposed by those 
articles had to be legislatively implemented to have the force of law.68 
In addition, the Senate modified the “substantial grounds” standard 
found in Article 3,69 stating that “the United States understands the 
phrase, ‘where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture,’ as used in Article 3 
of the Convention, to mean ‘if it is more likely than not that he would 
be tortured.’”70 
After ratification of the treaty, Congress took legislative steps to 
implement the Convention’s requirements. Primary among these was 
the passage of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 
1998 (FARRA),71 which gave effect to the Convention Against 
Torture using the following language: 
 
 65. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36198–99 (1990) (including a number of reservations and 
declarations in the Senate’s resolution of ratification). 
 66. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Humans Rights, and Conditional 
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 416 (2000). 
 67. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36198 (1990). 
 68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 111(3) (1987) (“Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international 
law and to international agreements of the United States, except that a ‘non-self-executing’ 
agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation.”). 
 69. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1 (“No State Party shall 
expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”). 
 70. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36198 (1990). 
 71. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 
112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2006) (United States Policy with Respect to 
Involuntary Return of Persons in Danger of Subjection to Torture)). In addition, the Torture 
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It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or 
otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in 
which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would 
be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the 
person is physically present in the United States.72 
FARRA required that “the heads of the appropriate agencies . . . 
prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United 
States under Article 3” of the Convention Against Torture.73 Such 
regulations have been promulgated by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)74 (the successor to the INS75), the Department of 
Justice (DOJ),76 and the State Department.77 The Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) has presumably instituted similar regulations, though 
these regulations, if they exist, are not public information.78 
Under the regulations that apply to the DHS and the DOJ, 
enforcement of a removal order may be withheld or deferred for 
aliens who meet their burden of proof if “the immigration judge 
determines that the alien is more likely than not to be tortured in the 
country of removal.”79 The State Department’s regulations implement 
the same standard with respect to extraditions, where the question 
considered is “whether a person facing extradition from the United 
States ‘is more likely than not’ to be tortured in the State requesting 
extradition.”80 This implementation of the Convention Against 
Torture raises concerns about its efficacy and ability to prevent 
extraordinary renditions undertaken to facilitate interrogational 
torture. 
 
Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 to 2340B (2006), also represents a partial implementation of the 
Convention’s requirements. 
 72. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2006) (United States Policy with Respect to Involuntary Return 
of Persons in Danger of Subjection to Torture). 
 73. Id.  
 74. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–.18 (2007). 
 75. See 6 U.S.C. § 291(a) (2006) (abolishing the Immigration and Naturalization Service);  
§ 291(b) (establishing the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services within the 
Department of Homeland Security). 
 76. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–.18. 
 77. 22 C.F.R. § 95.2 (2007). 
 78. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., NO. RL32890, 
RENDITIONS: CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY LAWS ON TORTURE, at 11 (2007); Radsan, supra note 
4, at 21 (“Whether or not the CIA has adopted regulations to implement Article Three 
principles is classified.”). 
 79. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(4), 1208.16(c)(4) (2007). 
 80. 22 C.F.R. § 95.2(b) (2007). 
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1. Alteration of the Governing Standard.  One of the most 
striking features of the understandings and reservations that the 
Senate attached to the Convention Against Torture is their 
substitution of a “more likely than not” and “would be tortured” test 
for the Convention’s language that specifies “substantial grounds” 
and “would be in danger of being subjected to torture” as the proper 
test.81 Professor Robert Chesney notes that the “substantial grounds” 
standard is critically important because it “functions as a standard of 
proof, setting the evidentiary bar for triggering a state’s Article 3 
obligations.”82 Changing that standard compromises the heart of 
Article 3’s protection against rendition to torture. The United States 
has responded that its replacement of the “substantial grounds” 
standard with a “more likely than not” test was “merely a clarification 
of the definitional scope of Article 3, rather than a statement that 
would exclude or modify the legal effect of Article 3 as it applied to 
the United States.”83 This explanation, however, ignores the clear 
difference between the “substantial grounds” standard and the “more 
likely than not” test. 
First, “more likely than not” establishes a higher burden of proof 
for a person seeking protection under Article 3 than “substantial 
grounds” does.84 “More likely than not” seems to require something 
greater than a 50 percent chance of torture, whereas a significantly 
smaller chance of torture might constitute “substantial grounds” for 
believing that a person would be tortured. In INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca,85 the Supreme Court held that a person seeking asylum need 
not show that persecution was “more likely than not” to satisfy the 
 
 81. This standard comes from one of the United States’ reservations made in ratifying the 
Convention Against Torture, which says, “the United States understands the phrase, ‘where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture,’ as used in Article 3 of the Convention, to mean ‘if it is more likely than not that he 
would be tortured.’” 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36198 (1990) (quoting Convention Against Torture, 
supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1). 
 82. Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantánamo: The Law of International Detainee 
Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 671 (2006). 
 83. United States Written Response to Questions Asked by the Committee Against 
Torture, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68554.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2008). 
 84. See Radsan, supra note 4, at 19 (arguing that this change “may have actually watered 
down the CAT’s requirement, making it easier to be in compliance on renditions”); John Yoo, 
Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1228 (2004) (stating that this change 
“substantively limits the [United States’] obligations under Article 3”). 
 85. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
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“well-founded fear of persecution” standard.86 As the Court put it, 
“One can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening 
when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking 
place.”87 The Court went on to endorse one commentator’s suggestion 
that a one in ten chance of severe persecution (death or exile and 
imprisonment in a labor camp) would suffice to create a well-founded 
fear.88 Similarly, something less that 50 percent could presumably 
constitute “substantial grounds for believing that [a person] would be 
in danger of being subjected to torture.”89 Thus the “more likely than 
not” standard is more permissive than the test established by the 
Convention Against Torture. 
Second, a less obvious alteration shifts the question from 
whether a person would be “in danger of being subjected to torture”90 
to whether a person actually “would be tortured.”91 This change, 
though subtle, shifts the inquiry toward individual risk and away from 
the destination country’s reputation. For example, under the 
substantial grounds standard, removing a person into the custody of a 
country with an extremely poor human rights record might, in and of 
itself, create sufficient danger to meet the Convention’s standard.92 By 
altering the standard to consider whether torture would occur, 
however, the United States directs attention away from the 
destination country’s reputation and emphasizes the individual case. 
This may contribute to excessive reliance on diplomatic promises to 
refrain from torture, given that diplomatic assurances are more 
attuned to addressing individual cases than overall reputation. Thus, 
the United States’ implementation of the Convention Against 
Torture distorts the original standard, replacing a standard that seeks 
 
  86. Id. at 431. 
 87. Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1. 
 90. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 2 (“No State Party shall expel, 
return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”). 
 91. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36198 (1990) (“[T]he United States understands the phrase, ‘where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture,’ as used in Article 3 of the Convention, to mean ‘if it is more likely than not that he 
would be tortured.’”). 
 92. Radsan, supra note 4, at 62 (describing Uzbekistan, Egypt, and Syria as three countries 
with such poor human rights records that any renditions to these countries would strain 
credulity with regard to compliance with the Convention Against Torture). 
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to avert all substantial dangers of torture with one that seeks only to 
prevent torture that will more likely than not actually occur. 
2. Reliance on Diplomatic Assurances.  When determining 
whether to remove or transfer an individual, the United States 
sometimes considers diplomatic assurances that the receiving country 
will not torture that individual.93 According to the State Department’s 
2005 report to the Committee Against Torture, “The United States 
obtains assurances, as appropriate, from the foreign government to 
which a detainee is transferred that it will not torture the individual 
being transferred.”94 Addressing allegations about extraordinary 
renditions, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice stated that “[w]here 
appropriate, the United States seeks assurances that transferred 
persons will not be tortured.”95 Nothing in the Convention Against 
Torture makes relying on such assurances illegal.96 According to the 
Convention, “competent authorities shall take into account all 
relevant considerations” when determining whether there are 
substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of 
being tortured.97 The United States treats diplomatic assurances as 
this type of relevant information when making an individualized 
assessment about whether an individual is “more likely than not” to 
be tortured.98 According to the United States’ Second Periodic Report 
to the Committee Against Torture, such assurances have, in a “very 
small number of cases,” formed the basis for allowing individuals to 
be removed.99 
The consideration of such assurances is part of the legal 
framework that implements the Convention Against Torture in 
 
 93. Id. at 44 (“On several occasions, the Bush Administration has noted that assurances 
affect its decisions on transfers of prisoners.”). 
 94. U.S. Dep’t of State et al., Second Periodic Report to the Committee Against Torture,  
¶ 30, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3 (June 29, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents 
/organization/62175.pdf. 
 95. Rice, supra note 58. 
 96. See Radsan, supra note 4, at 43–54 (discussing the use of diplomatic assurances under 
Article 3). 
 97. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 2. 
 98. See Radsan, supra note 4, at 23 (“[I]n the immigration context, assurances are laid out 
as one explicit factor in determining the legality of a rendition.”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c) 
(2007) (describing how assurances may be considered in deciding whether removal is consistent 
with Article 3). 
 99. U.S. Dep’t of State et al., supra note 94, para. 33. 
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immigration removal and extradition contexts. In immigration 
removal cases, the relevant regulations provide that 
(1) The Secretary of State may forward to the Attorney General 
assurances that the Secretary has obtained from the government of a 
specific country that an alien would not be tortured there if the alien 
were removed to that country. 
(2) If the Secretary of State forwards assurances described in 
paragraph (c)(1) of this section to the Attorney General for 
consideration by the Attorney General or her delegates under this 
paragraph, the Attorney General shall determine, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, whether the assurances are sufficiently 
reliable to allow the alien’s removal to that country consistent with 
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. The Attorney 
General’s authority under this paragraph may be exercised by the 
Deputy Attorney General or by the Commissioner, Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, but may not be further delegated.100 
The regulations governing extradition101 and inadmissibility for 
security reasons102 do not explicitly mention assurances, but 
assurances could presumably serve similar purposes in those contexts. 
Extraordinary renditions carried out by the CIA probably operate 
under similar guidelines, though such matters are classified 
information.103 
This reliance on assurances is problematic for a number of 
reasons. First, a need to procure such assurances to comply with 
Article 3 indicates that the receiving country may already have a 
questionable human rights record, which itself suggested an increased 
likelihood that an individual would be tortured.104 Second, monitoring 
compliance with such assurances is difficult, if not impossible, because 
 
 100. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c) (2007). Identical regulations govern the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(c) (2007). 
 101. 22 C.F.R. § 95 (2007). 
 102. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8 (2007). 
 103. See sources cited supra note 78. 
 104. See Dawn J. Miller, Holding States to Their Convention Obligations: The United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and the Need for a Broad Interpretation of State Action, 17 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 299, 303 (2003) (“[P]ast torture is evidence of the likelihood of future torture, and 
absent a showing of change in the human rights conditions of a country where past torture was 
experienced, such evidence is likely to be extremely persuasive.”); see also Lobel, supra note 5, 
at 1414 (“[G]overnment actions that are based on predictions or suspicions about future conduct 
are inherently less subject to clear rules than those based on evidence of what has already 
occurred.”). 
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“torture is conducted in secret and regimes that use torture have 
become adept at hiding it.”105 Without effective monitoring, a 
receiving country has little incentive to refrain from engaging in 
torture, given that its noncompliance will likely remain unknown.106 
Third, procuring assurances could (and perhaps has) become a rubber 
stamp for complying with the Convention Against Torture. Given 
that monitoring is difficult and that the incentives to prevent torture 
post hoc are relatively low, obtaining assurances may be a pro forma 
way to feign compliance with the Convention Against Torture.107 
Because of these problems, assurances should be used sparingly, if at 
all. Liberal use of such assurances effectively eviscerates the 
determination of whether an individual is “more likely than not” to 
be tortured—a determination that lies at the very heart of the 
Convention Against Torture. 
The possibility that such assurances have become a rubber stamp 
is particularly pertinent to Maher Arar’s case; he was reportedly only 
removed to Syria after the United States “received assurances from 
Syria that Arar would not be tortured.”108 Given Syria’s exceedingly 
poor human rights record,109 it is difficult to understand how removing 
anyone into Syrian custody could have comported with the 
 
 105. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 89. 
 106. See Chesney, supra note 82, at 696 (“[T]here is also substantial reason to doubt that 
compliance-monitoring mechanisms . . . will succeed in detecting abuse. . . . [E]ven in the event 
that non-compliance is detected, there are no mechanisms in place to impose accountability.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 107. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL AT RISK: DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES NO 
SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE 3 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/ 
eca0405.pdf (“[C]ountries that rely on such assurances are either engaging in wishful thinking or 
using the assurances as a figleaf to cover their complicity in torture and their role in the erosion 
of the international norm against torture.”). 
 108. DeNeen L. Brown, Canadian Sent to Mideast Files Suit, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2003, at 
A25. For an account of Arar’s experiences, see supra notes 18–39 and accompanying text. 
 109. Amnesty Int’l, Syrian Arab Republic: Briefing to the Human Rights Committee, 71st 
Session – March 2001, art. 7, MDE 24/001/2001 (Aug. 13, 2001), available at http://web.amnesty. 
org/library/pdf/MDE240012001ENGLISH/$File/MDE2400101.pdf (describing how Amnesty 
International has human rights concerns regarding Syrian torture practices). The State 
Department’s 2002 report on Syria’s human rights practices stated that its “human rights record 
remained poor, and it continued to commit serious abuses. . . . Continuing serious abuses 
included the use of torture in detention . . . . [T]here was credible evidence that security forces 
continued to use torture . . . .” BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, 108TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2002, 
at 2108–09 (Joint Comm. Print 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/ 
18289.htm. 
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Convention Against Torture,110 yet Syria’s assurances apparently 
sufficed in Arar’s case. If diplomatic assurances are given such 
significant weight without reciprocal accountability through effective 
monitoring,111 the protections of Article 3 are slight indeed. 
3. Designation of an Interested Decisionmaker.  The United 
States’ implementation of the Convention Against Torture also fails 
to provide full Article 3 protection, because the process for 
determining whether a person is protected from removal under 
Article 3 invites an improper balancing of the state’s interests against 
the individual’s interests. Under the existing regulations, 
determinations of whether a detainee is “more likely than not” to 
suffer torture may be made at the highest levels, usually by the 
secretary of state or the attorney general.112 As high-level executive 
branch officials, these decisionmakers are also likely to know about 
the potential intelligence value of detainees, and this knowledge may 
influence their decisions. For example, a decisionmaker might believe 
that a particular detainee knew important information about 
impending terrorist plots, but would not disclose that information 
under interrogations carried out within the bounds of domestic law. 
Rendering that person to a country that practiced more forceful 
interrogation techniques might yield valuable information and save 
American lives. Knowing the potential benefits of more intensive 
questioning could influence that decisionmaker’s determination about 
whether removing or rendering a particular suspect would comport 
with Article 3. This type of balancing, however, is entirely contrary to 
the purpose of the Convention Against Torture, which expressly 
prohibits torture regardless of what exigent circumstances arise.113 
4. Evasion of Judicial Review and Public Scrutiny.  In its written 
response to questions from the Committee Against Torture, the 
 
 110. Radsan, supra note 4, at 62 (noting that any renditions to Syria might run afoul of the 
Convention Against Torture because of Syria’s poor human rights record). 
 111. Arar’s case demonstrates a lack of effective monitoring, despite the United States’ 
reliance on diplomatic assurances. Indeed, even the visits of Canadian consular officials were 
ineffective at stopping the torture. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 112. 22 C.F.R. §§ 95.1–.3 (2007) (authorizing the Secretary of State and the Deputy 
Secretary of State to make Article 3 determinations in extradition cases). 
 113. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 2, para. 2 (“No exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability 
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”). 
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United States reiterated that it “does not comment on information or 
reports relating to alleged intelligence operations.”114 The United 
States has largely refrained from commenting on the case of Maher 
Arar, despite the widespread publicity his story has received.115 This 
silence extends to the process of extraordinary rendition, which the 
United States generally does not publicly acknowledge.116 This opacity 
is only augmented by the fact that the legislation implementing the 
Convention expressly states that no court has jurisdiction to review 
regulations promulgated under it.117 The various implementing 
regulations reiterate this restriction on the availability of judicial 
review.118 Furthermore, Arar’s case demonstrates how difficult it is to 
bring a claim based on a determination under the Convention Against 
Torture, and he was removed after being deemed inadmissible for 
security reasons, not through the more covert process of 
extraordinary rendition.119 Even if one or more of Arar’s claims had 
withstood initial review in federal district court, he still would have 
needed to overcome the assertion of the “state-secrets privilege,” 
with its attendant deference to the government action in question.120 
Given this lack of information and the restrictions placed on judicial 
review, the practical application of the “more likely than not” 
standard takes place with little transparency or accountability.121 
 
 114. United States Written Response to Questions Asked by the Committee Against 
Torture, supra note 83. 
 115. COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO 
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2006), available at http://ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf 
(“There was a great deal of media coverage of Mr. Arar’s case in the later stages of his 
imprisonment in Syria and even more after his return to Canada.”). 
 116. See Radsan, supra note 4, at 50 (“Except for isolated comments by a few officials, the 
Bush Administration has not said much about irregular rendition.”). 
 117. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2006) (United States Policy with Respect to Involuntary Return 
of Persons in Danger of Subjection to Torture) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review the 
regulations adopted to implement this section, and nothing in this section shall be construed as 
providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under the Convention or this 
section . . . .”). 
 118. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 95.4 (2007) (“Decisions of the Secretary concerning surrender of 
fugitives for extradition are matters of executive discretion not subject to judicial review.”). 
 119. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 120. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 121. The combination of government silence, the lack of judicial review, and the fact that a 
detainee rendered to another country is likely unable to protest all combine to shroud these 
determinations in secrecy. Cases that come to light (like Maher Arar’s) are likely the exception, 
not the rule. 
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B. Avoidance and the Fourth Geneva Convention 
Outside the domestic legal context, the United States has 
reportedly used extraordinary renditions in the war in Iraq.122 Those 
extraordinary renditions must be evaluated according to the legal 
obligations imposed by the Geneva Conventions.123 The United 
States’ legal analysis of the permissibility of extraordinary rendition 
in Iraq proceeded from the assumption that detainees whom it 
wanted to render were protected persons.124 In dealing with such 
“protected persons,” Article 49 states: “Individual or mass forcible 
transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied 
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any 
other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their 
motive.”125 
Despite the language of Article 49, the United States has 
explored ways to circumvent the prohibition on removing “protected 
persons” from the occupied territory of Iraq. In a draft 
memorandum,126 then-Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith, 
the head of the Office of Legal Counsel,127 examined the applicability 
of Article 49 and concluded: 
[T]he United States may, consistent with article 49, (1) remove 
“protected persons” who are illegal aliens from Iraq pursuant to 
local immigration law; and (2) relocate “protected persons” 
(whether illegal aliens or not) from Iraq to another country to 
 
 122. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 64 n.351. 
 123. For background on the Fourth Geneva Convention, see supra Part I.B. 
 124. See ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 65 n.351 (stating that the memorandum concerns “protected 
persons”). 
 125. IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 49, para. 1. 
 126. Draft Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Mar. 19, 
2004), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 366–80 (Karen J. Greenberg & 
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Goldsmith Memorandum]. 
 127. The Office of Legal Counsel is housed within the Justice Department, and “[t]he 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel assists the Attorney 
General in his function as legal advisor to the President and all the executive branch agencies.” 
United States Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, http://www.usdoj.gov/olc (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2008). 
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facilitate interrogation, for a brief but not indefinite period, so long 
as adjudicative proceedings have not been initiated against them.128 
Goldsmith’s analysis separated “protected persons” into three groups: 
illegal aliens, those who have been accused of an offense, and those 
who have not been accused of an offense.129 
For illegal aliens, Goldsmith argued that Article 49 does not 
apply because the terms “deportations” and “forcible transfers” refer 
to permanent transfers of inhabitants from areas in which they had a 
lawful right to be.130 He argued that in international law the term 
“deportation” meant “removal of a person from a country where he 
has a legal right to be,” rather than simply meaning removing a 
person from one country to another.131 Goldsmith then addressed the 
term “transfer,” concluding that it is used somewhat interchangeably 
with “deportation,” and thus only applies to legal inhabitants of the 
occupied territory.132 To make this case, Goldsmith cited instances in 
which the words have been used interchangeably or the word 
“deportation” has been used as shorthand for describing the Article 
49 prohibition.133 This evidence shows that these terms do overlap to 
some extent, but does not shed light on what distinguishes the two 
terms. Given that these terms do not apply to illegal aliens, 
Goldsmith concluded that illegal aliens were not protected by Article 
49.134 
Goldsmith argued that this implicit exception to the Article 49 
prohibition on deporting or forcibly transferring “protected persons” 
“comports with common sense” because failing to remove illegal 
aliens would make the Convention “a welcome mat to occupied 
territory.”135 Yet Goldsmith himself noted that those who violate Iraqi 
immigration law are subject to imprisonment, and that under 
customary international law, the United States is likely required to 
enforce the existing Iraqi immigration laws.136 This belies his 
 
 128. Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 126, at 367–68. 
 129. Id. at 368, 374–75. 
 130. Id. at 374. 
 131. Id. at 371. 
 132. Id. at 371–72. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 372. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 374. 
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suggestion that comprehensive Article 49 protection would constitute 
a “welcome mat” for illegal aliens. 
Given that the plain language of Article 49 establishes a blanket 
prohibition of forcible transfers of “protected persons,”137 an 
exception to that prohibition should only be allowed when it can be 
demonstrated with equal clarity. Goldsmith’s memorandum does not 
convincingly show that the term “transfer” only applies to legal 
inhabitants. Thus, Article 49 seems to protect even illegal aliens from 
forcible transfer, though they could still be imprisoned under local 
law. This conclusion also comports with Article 76,138 which requires 
that “[p]rotected persons accused of offences [presumably even 
immigration-related offenses] shall be detained in the occupied 
country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein.”139 
Goldsmith’s second argument proceeded on the foundation 
created by his analysis of “deportations” and “transfers.” First, he 
acknowledged that Article 76 clearly prohibits removing a “protected 
person” against whom “adjudicative proceedings have been 
initiated.”140 Nevertheless, Goldsmith argued that the terms 
“deportation” and “transfer” reference only an extended, indefinite, 
or permanent removal from the occupied country.141 Goldsmith said 
that these terms have the connotation of “uprooting from one’s 
home” and suggest that “resettlement” will be required.142 They do 
not include a “mere temporary absence, for a brief and definite 
period, from one’s still-established home.”143 Thus Goldsmith 
concluded that it would be permissible to relocate people in this class 
of protected persons to another country for a “brief but not indefinite 
period” to facilitate interrogation.144 
This analysis goes to some lengths to recast the straightforward 
prohibition found in Article 49. It establishes two distinct 
justifications for why extraordinary rendition of a “protected person” 
from Iraq to another country would not violate Article 49. First, an 
 
 137. IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 49, para. 1. 
 138. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 55, at 363 (describing Article 76 as 
“based on the fundamental principle forbidding deportations laid down in Article 49”). 
 139. IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 76, para. 1. 
 140. Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 126, at 375. 
 141. Id. at 375–76. 
 142. Id. at 376. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 379. 
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individual who is an illegal alien does not receive Article 49 
protection.145 This raises the question whether an illegal alien could be 
removed to any nation willing to receive that individual. Presumably, 
an illegal alien would need to be charged under Iraqi immigration 
law, which would seem to implicate the protection against removal 
found in Article 76, which applies to “[p]rotected persons accused of 
offences.”146 Second, a “protected person” could be removed through 
extraordinary rendition so long as that removal was a “temporary 
relocation . . . for a brief but not indefinite period.”147 
Why would the United States go to such lengths to justify 
removing a “protected person” from Iraq? The memorandum 
concludes that the United States may “relocate ‘protected persons’ 
(whether illegal aliens or not) from Iraq to another country to 
facilitate interrogation.”148 This reason is repeated throughout the 
memorandum, and no other explanations are offered, though 
explanations such as prison overcrowding and detainee safety might 
be plausible alternatives. This focus on “facilitating interrogation,” 
though, raises a number of questions: Where would these detainees 
be sent? How would carrying out an interrogation in another country 
facilitate that interrogation? What safeguards would prevent the 
receiving countries from torturing detainees to facilitate their 
interrogation? The commonly proffered argument is that “an allied 
nation may have cultural or linguistic connections with a captured 
individual that the United States lacks, placing that nation in a 
position to more effectively establish a rapport with the individual 
and allowing for more effective interrogations.”149 The more cynical 
explanation is that some countries interrogate more effectively 
because they utilize torture.150 Given the United States’ insistence that 
this type of extraordinary rendition does not violate Article 49, it is 
 
 145. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text. 
 146. IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 76, para. 1. 
 147. Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 126, at 380. 
 148. Id. at 368. 
 149. Yoo, supra note 84, at 1187. 
 150. See ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4–5 (“U.S. officials reportedly are seeking opportunities to transfer 
terrorist suspects to locations where it is known that they may be tortured, hoping to gain useful 
information with the use of abusive interrogation tactics.”); Radsan, supra note 4, at 3 
(“[A]ccording to the surprisingly candid statements of one CIA official, officials in other 
countries might use interrogation techniques that the United States does not, may not, and 
should not use.”). 
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reasonable to question its underlying motives. Responding to 
criticism of this memorandum, Goldsmith notes that he “never 
finalized the draft, it never became operational, and it was never 
relied on to take anyone outside of Iraq.”151 Nevertheless, the 
memorandum’s focus on circumventing legal protections to enable 
extraterritorial interrogations exemplifies a common tendency in the 
struggle against terrorism. 
IV.  THE PRECARIOUS STATE 
 OF THE ABSOLUTE NORM AGAINST TORTURE 
A. The Expedience of Interrogational Torture 
The United States remains opposed to torture based on most of 
the traditional motivations for torture that Professor David Luban 
identifies, including “victor’s pleasure, terror, punishment, and 
extracting confessions.”152 Nevertheless, Luban also suggests that 
modern liberalism (in the sense of “liberal democracy”) might not be 
wholly opposed to “torture as a technique of intelligence gathering 
from captives who will not talk.”153 Torturing terrorists may seem like 
a small price to pay when that torture could yield lifesaving 
information.154 Indeed, by offering a humanitarian motivation for 
torture, this understanding dissociates torture from its most illiberal 
aspects—its inherent cruelty, tyrannical nature, and disregard for 
human dignity.155 In this context, preventive interrogational torture is 
portrayed as almost pragmatic and humanitarian, rather than simply 
barbaric and authoritarian.156 
This utilitarian motivation for torture seems to have become 
more prominent given the attention paid to terrorism as a national 
 
 151. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 172 (2007). Goldsmith also says that the 
memorandum noted that “persons temporarily relocated outside of Iraq” would retain their 
Geneva Convention protections against torture. Id. at 242–43 n.45. 
 152. Luban, supra note 16, at 1436. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Professor Alan Dershowitz describes the calculus under which nonlethal torture might 
be warranted: “The simple cost-benefit analysis for employing such nonlethal torture seems 
overwhelming: it is surely better to inflict nonlethal pain on one guilty terrorist who is illegally 
withholding information needed to prevent an act of terrorism than to permit a large number of 
innocent victims to die.” ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING 
THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 144 (2002). 
 155. See Luban, supra note 16, at 1430 (“Torture aims to strip away from its victim all the 
qualities of human dignity that liberalism prizes.”). 
 156. See id. at 1436 (“Torture to gather intelligence and save lives seems almost heroic.”). 
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security threat.157 The difficulties of dealing with decentralized 
terrorist organizations have created new challenges and rendered 
many of the intelligence-gathering methods calibrated to deal with 
nation-state actors relatively ineffective.158 Professor Jules Lobel 
describes the United States’ response to the attacks of September 11, 
2001, in terms of a “preventative paradigm”: “The Bush 
administration’s response to the September 11 attacks has been 
characterized by a paradigm shift in fighting terrorism: from a 
defensive to offensive strategy, from reliance on deterrence to a new 
emphasis on preemption, from backward to forward-looking 
measures, and from prosecution to prevention.”159 Given the 
decentralized way in which terrorist organizations operate, good 
intelligence is crucial to disrupting their operations and preventing 
attacks.160 Although captured terrorists may have good intelligence to 
offer, they may be loath to reveal information that would endanger 
fellow terrorists, undermine the organizations they represent, and 
frustrate their attempts to launch additional attacks. This need for 
information explains why the incentive to engage in or condone 
interrogational torture has increased with the growing struggle 
against terrorism. Though torture may yield some false confessions, it 
also sometimes yields good information, particularly when the 
information sought is easily verified.161 As Professor Alan Dershowitz 
argues, “It is impossible to avoid the difficult moral dilemma of 
choosing among evils by denying the empirical reality that torture 
sometimes works, even if it does not always work.”162 Thus, the 
preventive paradigm has placed a premium on intelligence, thereby 
 
 157. See Lobel, supra note 5, at 1408 (“The administration has justified its use of coercive 
interrogation tactics against detainees . . . by asserting the necessity of preventing future 
terrorist attacks.”). Professor Lobel contends that the Bush administration has focused on 
“coercive prevention,” which entails using force “to detain suspected terrorists . . . and send 
individuals to nations that will detain and likely torture them.” Id. at 1409. 
 158. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 151, at 72–74 (describing how the struggle against 
terrorism involves far more uncertainty and “chronic obscurity” than prior military struggles 
against other nations that took place in specific geographic locations). 
 159. Lobel, supra note 5, at 1407. 
 160. See id. at 1409 (“The turn toward prevention is not surprising. When faced with 
potential terrorist threats, it makes sense to focus efforts on preventing future attacks, as 
opposed to merely punishing those who have attacked the United States.”). 
 161. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 154, at 136–37 (“There are numerous instances in which 
torture has produced self-proving, truthful information that was necessary to prevent harm to 
civilians.”). 
 162. Id. at 137. 
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making interrogational torture expedient and revealing weaknesses in 
the United States’ implementation of international prohibitions on 
torture. 
B. The Arar Case as Evidence of a Declining Norm 
Maher Arar’s story163 presents a specific example of how the 
United States might profit from interrogational torture while 
apparently complying with its implementation of the Convention 
Against Torture. It thus presents a useful test case for evaluating the 
United States’ implementation of the Convention, given that Arar 
was removed to Syria through normal removal processes.164 Despite 
these processes, however, Arar allegedly experienced the very sort of 
torture that the Convention seeks to prevent. Notably, the torture 
alleged in Arar’s complaint fits the pattern of torture that the State 
Department detailed in its 2002 report on human rights practices in 
Syria. According to that report, “there was credible evidence that 
[Syrian] security forces continued to use torture.”165 Accounts of state-
sponsored torture in Syria include reports of torture by a variety of 
methods, including 
administering electrical shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing 
objects into the rectum; beating, sometimes while the victim is 
suspended from the ceiling; hyperextending the spine; bending the 
detainees into the frame of a wheel and whipping exposed body 
parts; and using a chair that bends backwards to asphyxiate the 
victim or fracture the victim’s spine.166 
In addition, the report noted that although torture did occur in Syrian 
prisons, it was “most likely to occur while detainees were being held 
at one of the many detention centers run by the various security 
services throughout the country, especially while the authorities were 
attempting to extract a confession or information.”167 This fits with 
Arar’s story, given that he was tortured using some of these methods 
and threatened with others, all with the goal of extracting information 
from him.168 In Arar’s case, the regulations that implement the 
 
 163. See supra notes 18–39 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 165. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 109, at 2109. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
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Convention Against Torture apparently failed to protect him from 
torture. Indeed, they not only failed to protect him from torture 
generally, but also failed to protect him from the very kinds of torture 
that the United States government knew Syria practiced. 
V.  ADDRESSING THE EROSION OF THE NORM AGAINST TORTURE 
Increased political pressure to forestall terrorist attacks and 
eradicate terrorist networks has revealed significant flaws in the 
United States’ implementation of the Convention Against Torture.169 
This inadequate implementation likely originated in concern over 
subjecting U.S. sovereignty to broadly written international 
agreements.170 Though these shortcomings have existed since the 
Convention was first implemented, the struggle against terrorism has 
greatly magnified their pernicious effects.171 Its origins aside, the 
lessons of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison172 and cases like 
Maher Arar’s demand decisive action to strengthen U.S. adherence to 
international norms against torture. Such action could conceivably 
originate in the executive or legislative branch, but legislative change 
would be preferable. Legislative change would be more effective 
because the pressure to combat terrorism falls most directly on the 
 
 169. See supra Parts III–IV. 
 170. See Nagan & Atkins, supra note 48, at 109 (“The United States’ long refusal to ratify 
the Convention Against Torture is indicative of its general unwillingness to subscribe to the 
treaty-based regime concerned with international human rights.”); John B. Bellinger III, Legal 
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Transatlantic Approaches to International Law and Institutions, 
Speech at Duke University School of Law: Center for International and Comparative Law 
(Nov. 15, 2006), in 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 513, 517–19 (2007) (describing how differences 
in historical experience, legal tradition, and national culture make the United State more 
hesitant than its European allies to endorse legal frameworks that codify broad principles and 
create comprehensive systems of rules). Bellinger states that the United States’ 
problem-oriented approach also predisposes us to distinguish between issues that we 
believe lend themselves to international legal resolution and those that do not. This 
can be at odds with a European tendency—heightened by experience with the 
European Union—to see the ideal international legal framework as one that is 
comprehensive and cohesive, that covers the field. 
Id. at 519. 
 171. See sources cited supra note 3. 
 172. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, International Criminal Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 579, 593–96 (2004) 
(summarizing accounts of American military personnel abusing detainees at Abu Ghraib 
prison). 
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executive branch.173 The president is “Commander in Chief”174 and has 
extensive responsibility for the nation’s foreign affairs.175 Therefore, 
pressure to gather useful intelligence and forestall terrorist attacks 
falls primarily on the president and executive agencies under the 
president’s control, especially intelligence agencies like the CIA and 
the National Security Agency. 
In an ideal scenario, the executive branch would strengthen the 
international norm against torture by giving more credence to a 
country’s human rights record and less to its diplomatic assurances. 
Given that the executive branch stands at the forefront of U.S. 
foreign policy, its conduct inevitably affects domestic and 
international perceptions about the United States’ stance on torture. 
Memoranda that attempt to circumvent international legal 
obligations or redefine what constitutes torture convey a discontinuity 
between the United States’ rhetoric and practice on the issue of 
torture. Regardless of what occurs in practice, the impression that the 
United States condones torture is enough to weaken the international 
norm against torture.176 Unfortunately, the political pressures on the 
executive branch have apparently encouraged a belief in the merits of 
interrogational torture.177 This understanding has been formed outside 
the typical channels of political dialogue and implemented in a 
secretive manner that is antithetical to the democratic principles of 
transparency and accountability.178 
 
 173. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 151, at 75 (describing “an executive branch entirely 
responsible for protecting the safety of Americans but largely in the dark about where or how 
the next terrorist attack will occur”). 
 174. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States . . . .”). 
 175. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The 
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with 
foreign nations.” (quoting Representative John Marshall, 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800)). 
 176. See Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 3, at 127 & n.33 (describing extraordinary 
rendition as a practice that “involves the state-sponsored abduction of a person in one country, 
with or without the cooperation of the government of that country, and the subsequent transfer 
of that person to another country for detention and interrogation” (footnotes omitted)). 
 177. See Luban, supra note 16, at 1452–61 (describing the “torture culture” created by a 
“group of lawyers in President George W. Bush’s administration who wrote the highly-
permissive secret memoranda that came close to legitimizing torture for interrogational 
purposes”). 
 178. See Nagan & Atkins, supra note 48, at 89 (“[T]he practice of torture is often among the 
least transparent aspects of governmental policy and practice.”); Radsan, supra note 4, at 4 
(“[R]endition is the hidden domain of intelligence services, not the open realm of courts, 
prosecutors, and defense lawyers.”); id. at 51 (arguing that the “administration should move 
from secrecy toward transparency” regarding the practice of extraordinary rendition). 
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Given its self-chosen international legal obligation to prevent 
torture, the United States should publicly announce any fundamental 
change in its policy regarding torture. Similarly, as a constitutional 
democracy, a fundamental change of this magnitude should issue 
from transparent democratic process, not from secret, high-level 
policy decisions. To address the issue of torture in the context of 
extraordinary renditions, the United States government needs to 
reinforce its implementation of the international norms against state-
sponsored torture through legislation that openly ventilates the issue 
of interrogational torture. 
Congress should adopt legislation strengthening its 
implementation of Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. In 
essence, this legislation would supplement the initial implementation 
of the Convention. Such legislation would be designed to reduce the 
burden of proof on applicants who seek to defer removal, replacing 
the “more likely than not” standard with something closer to the 
“substantial grounds” standard found in the Convention Against 
Torture or the “well-founded fear of persecution” standard that 
operates in the asylum context.179 In addition, this legislation should 
make the provisions of the Convention Against Torture applicable to 
extraordinary renditions that take place outside the United States. 
Finally, Congress should revise the existing system to incorporate an 
impartial decisionmaker who could better ensure compliance with 
Article 3. This revised decisionmaking process could take a variety of 
forms, as long as it separated the determination of whether removal 
was consistent with Article 3 from the knowledge of an individual’s 
potential intelligence value. 
If Congress and the president are unwilling to strengthen the 
United States’ implementation and application of the Convention 
Against Terror, their reasons for opposing a more robust policy 
prohibiting torture should be addressed through public debate. 
Professor Dershowitz has rightly noted that “[i]f we tolerate torture, 
but keep it off the books and below the radar screen, we compromise 
principles of democratic accountability.”180 As noted in Part II, the 
United States has maintained strong rhetorical opposition to torture, 
 
 179. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) 
(2006)) (describing how the “well-founded fear of persecution” standard operates in certain 
asylum cases). 
 180. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 154, at 153. 
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regardless of the circumstances.181 If that position no longer reflects 
either the normative view of policymakers or the objective reality on 
the ground, that change should be publicly acknowledged. That 
discussion could take place on an abstract level and in general policy 
terms without revealing sensitive national security information. The 
possibility of institutionalizing torture by requiring a legal “torture 
warrant,” a proposal made by Professor Dershowitz, could provide a 
starting point for this debate.182 Under his proposal, 
An application for a torture warrant would have to be based on the 
absolute need to obtain immediate information in order to save lives 
coupled with probable cause that the suspect had such information 
and is unwilling to reveal it. 
The suspect would be given immunity from prosecution based on 
information elicited by the torture. The warrant would limit the 
torture to nonlethal means, such as sterile needles, being inserted 
beneath the nails to cause excruciating pain without endangering 
life.183 
This proposal is not intended to rationalize or endorse state-
sponsored torture. If the United States is not willing to strengthen its 
laws and policies to match its strong rhetorical stance against torture, 
that alone indicates that this debate is likely already occurring, and 
ground has been given to torture advocates at the highest political 
levels. This debate must be public because it concerns a fundamental 
moral and ethical decision with vast implications. Such decisions are 
best made through an open and transparent democratic process, not 
by elite policymakers. 
CONCLUSION 
The events of September 11, 2001, awakened the United States 
to the threat of international terrorism. In response to that threat, the 
United States has undertaken a comprehensive struggle against 
 
 181. See supra Part II. 
 182. Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at 
A19. Professor Dershowitz is not alone in having proposed legalizing torture as an alternative to 
its extralegal use. See, e.g., Andrew H. Moyer, Note, The Lesser of Two Evils? An Argument for 
Judicially Sanctioned Torture in a Post-9/11 World, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 469, 489 (2004) 
(“Compared to the current policy of practicing torture ‘under the radar screen,’ however, 
[judicially sanctioned torture] may indeed be the lesser of two evils.”). 
 183. Dershowitz, supra note 182.  
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terrorism. In that struggle to prevent terrorist attacks, intelligence 
information about terrorist organizations and their operations is at a 
premium, yet developing such intelligence has proven difficult. This 
intelligence-gathering problem has put pressure on the United States’ 
legal obligation to refrain from engaging in or condoning torture. 
That pressure has revealed weaknesses in how that the United States 
has implemented the Convention Against Torture. In addition, it has 
shown that the efficacy of a strong norm against torture remains open 
to debate within the United States. 
The Convention Against Torture embodies a comprehensive 
prohibition of torture in all circumstances. It goes beyond simply 
requiring that its members refrain from state-sponsored torture and 
mandates that they also avoid extraditing or returning individuals to 
other countries when there are “substantial grounds for believing” 
that those individuals would be in danger of being tortured.184 The 
United States has partially implemented this norm into its legal 
system, but that implementation leaves something to be desired. By 
changing the standard from “substantial grounds for believing” that 
an individual would be in danger of torture to “more likely than not” 
that an individual would be tortured, the United States has made it 
more difficult for an individual to successfully claim Article 3 
protection. This protection has been reduced even further by the 
United States’ reliance on diplomatic assurances that the destination 
country will not torture the individual in question. Relying on such 
assurances improperly discounts the human rights record of the 
destination country and risks making assurances a talisman for 
compliance, thus further weakening Article 3 protection against 
torture. Finally, the decisionmaking process for Article 3 compliance 
may be compromised when the decisionmaker also weighs 
information about the potential intelligence value of the individual in 
question. Such balancing is contrary to the absolute prohibition that 
the Convention Against Torture establishes. 
Thus far the debate about torture has stayed below the surface, 
shielded from view by the secrecy surrounding intelligence affairs and 
the lack of judicial review. The decision to facilitate interrogational 
torture, however, should not be made without public debate and 
democratic process. In light of the importance of this question, 
Congress should strengthen the implementation of the existing 
 
 184. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1. 
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international norms against state-sponsored torture, thereby opening 
the issue up for public debate. Without substantive legislative reform 
or open debate about the legitimacy of torturing suspected terrorists 
for intelligence purposes, the United States’ use of extraordinary 
renditions to facilitate interrogation will continue to subvert 
transparent democratic process and undermine existing international 
norms against state-sponsored torture. 
